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ABSTRACT
In every federal civil case, a defendant must raise its affirmative
defenses in the pleading that responds to a plaintiff’s complaint.
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), failure to properly
plead, for example, a statute of limitations defense, waives the
defense for good. Rule 8(c) does not exempt any category of
affirmative defense, nor does it forgive unintentional omissions of
certain defenses. It also does not prefer governmental defendants to
others. Yet in habeas corpus cases, the most significant affirmative
defenses to habeas petitions need not comply with Rule 8(c). Instead,
federal courts may raise the affirmative defenses of statute of
limitations, exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default and
nonretroactivity sua sponte even if the defense would otherwise be
waived pursuant to Rule 8(c).
This Article contends that habeas litigation is the worst place to
grant State respondents any sort of procedural favor. Habeas cases
implicate criminal convictions that are fundamentally unfair. And
habeas petitioners need all the help they can get—since the passage of
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the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
the odds of winning habeas relief are akin to the odds of winning the
lottery.
After examining the history of affirmative defenses, the Article
next describes the purpose behind Rule 8(c) and argues that the rule
was meant to be strictly applied. It next explains how federal courts’
willingness to take sua sponte action on behalf of habeas respondents
violates both the spirit and the letter of Rule 8(c). It further argues that
the Supreme Court’s reliance on comity and other policy-based
justifications do not suffice to overcome the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which apply without regard to what sort of case is being
heard. In light of the curtailed substantive paths to habeas relief, it
also contends that habeas cases are the worst candidates for
aggressive sua sponte advocacy that revives affirmative defenses at
the expense of those imprisoned unfairly.
With respect to Rule 8(c), habeas respondents should be treated
similarly to, not differently from, every other civil defendant. The
Article concludes that assisting respondents with sua sponte action in
habeas cases conflicts with the purpose of an adversarial system by
giving an unfair advantage to defendants who need it the least.
INTRODUCTION

I

n every federal civil case, a defendant must raise its affirmative
defenses in the pleading that responds to a plaintiff’s complaint.1
Unless granted leave to amend, failure to properly plead, for example,
a statute of limitations defense, waives that defense for good.2 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) (Rule 8(c)) states this requirement in
simple terms: “In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively
state any . . . affirmative defense.”3 The rule does not exempt any
particular defense—res judicata is as waivable as the defense of injury
by fellow servant.4 The rule does not forgive unintentional omissions
of certain defenses.5 Nor does the rule give preferential treatment to

1

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1278 (3d ed. 1998).
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
4 See id.
5 Harris v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 343 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
2
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government defendants, even though they receive concessions
6
elsewhere in the Rules.
Although habeas petitions challenge criminal convictions, they are
treated as civil cases in federal court and proceed through federal
dockets much like other civil cases. There are some semantic
differences. In habeas litigation, plaintiffs challenging their state
criminal convictions—“petitioners”—sue “respondents.” Still, like
any other civil defendant, respondents may answer or move to dismiss
a habeas petition.7 Yet, the Supreme Court has exempted the most
significant affirmative defenses to habeas petitions from the strictures
of Rule 8(c).
Although ordinarily the affirmative defense of statute of limitations
“is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in an amendment
thereto,” this is not the case when a State is responding to a habeas
petition.8 Instead, federal courts may raise the defense on the State’s
behalf sua sponte even if the State fails to raise it in its first
responsive pleading.9 The same is true with respect to the affirmative
defenses of exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default and
nonretroactivity—all survive despite a habeas respondent’s failure to
comply with Rule 8(c).10 As a result, affirmative defenses that would
be deemed waived in any other federal civil case survive in habeas
actions even when respondents fail to comply with Rule 8(c).
Sua sponte action of any kind is a departure from an adversarial
system of litigation and risks handing an advantage to the party that
benefits from the sua sponte act. The stakes are certainly higher in
habeas than they are, for example, in copyright. Nevertheless, federal
courts are less willing to raise affirmative defenses sua sponte in

6 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(B) (“A party must serve an answer to a
counterclaim or crossclaim within 20 days after being served with the pleading that states
the counterclaim or crossclaim.”) (emphasis added), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(2) (“The
United States, a United States agency, or a United States officer or employee sued only in
an official capacity must serve an answer to a complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim
within 60 days after service on the United States attorney.”) (emphasis added).
7 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, R. 5 (discussing answer to
habeas petition); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989) (respondent may move
to dismiss habeas petition).
8 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006).
9 See id. (lower court has discretion to correct State’s error and dismiss habeas petition
as untimely).
10 Id. at 206, 208.
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copyright actions than they are in habeas cases.11 How can this be? In
copyright, a plaintiff seeks money damages. In habeas, a petitioner
seeks his freedom.
This Article will not chronicle the many ways in which habeas has
been substantively curtailed.12 Instead, it examines how federal
courts’ willingness to take sua sponte action on behalf of habeas
respondents violates procedural rules and relies on unsound policy.
Given the curtailed substantive paths to habeas relief, habeas cases
are the worst candidates for aggressive sua sponte advocacy that
revives affirmative defenses at the expense of parties seeking to void
unfair convictions. At a minimum, when it comes to procedural rules
like Rule 8(c), habeas respondents should be treated similarly to, not
more preferentially than, every other civil defendant.
The Article begins by describing how a federal habeas petition
moves through federal court much like any other federal civil case.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in habeas cases just as
they do in other civil cases. Second, it traces the history of affirmative
defenses in federal practice and explains how those defenses must be
pled in light of Rule 8(c). Third, the Article reviews federal courts’
reliance on their sua sponte authority and contends that sua sponte
raising of affirmative defenses has significant consequences that upset
the adversarial system.
Fourth, the Article argues that Rule 8(c) should be strictly applied
in habeas actions and that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence fails to
offer any sound reason—policy, practical, or otherwise—that justifies
helping habeas respondents by raising their affirmative defenses sua
sponte. The Article concludes by contending that assisting
respondents with sua sponte action in habeas cases violates the most
important aspect of American litigation’s adversarial system: it gives
an unfair advantage to defendants who have no need for the courts’
advocacy.

11 E.g., Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) (reversing
district court’s raising of affirmative defense of fair use sua sponte in copyright
infringement case).
12 A habeas petition has very little chance of succeeding in federal court since Congress
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.),
which created “a series of new procedural obstacles,” including “a first-ever time limit for
filing a first habeas petition; stricter barriers to review of second and successive petitions;
and a new, tougher standard of review.” Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essays,
Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 806 (2009).
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I
HABEAS CORPUS: SUBSTANTIVELY UNIQUE, PROCEDURALLY
UNREMARKABLE
The volume of law review articles and seminal Supreme Court
decisions attests to the fact that habeas corpus matters. The writ has a
storied purpose: “[T]he protection of individuals against erosion of
13
their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.”
Blackstone himself labeled it “the great and efficacious writ, in all
manner of illegal confinement.”14 Even its nickname, “the Great
Writ,” signals to every law student learning about it for the first time
to pay attention.15
In granting a habeas petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
a single federal judge can overturn the judgment of a state’s highest
court when the petition relates to “the application of the United States
Constitution or laws to the facts in question.”16 “[A]bsent suspension,
the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual
detained within the United States.”17 The Supreme Court had
described the “preferred place of the Great Writ in our constitutional
system,”18 but its efficacy has been eroded over time by substantive
and procedural hurdles.
The Great Writ has come under fire in recent decades. In 1996,
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), which implemented significant changes to the
manner in which habeas petitions may be brought and on what
grounds habeas challenges may be raised. “AEDPA imposed strict
time limits on the filing of federal habeas corpus actions, gave
13

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 131 (Lewis ed., 1902)).
15 Law students are likely introduced to habeas through a discussion of Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (2 Wall.) (1866), in which “the Court struck down military commissions
convened unilaterally by President Lincoln during the Civil War largely as a violation of
the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, rejecting the government’s argument
that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 had effectively authorized President Lincoln’s
actions.” Stephen I. Vladeck, Book Review, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 941, 963 (2011); see also Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 46–47 (1972) (Douglas, J.
concurring) (“[H]abeas corpus is an overriding remedy to test the jurisdiction of the
military to try or to detain a person” and “[t]he classic case is Ex parte Milligan . . . where
habeas corpus was issued on behalf of a civilian tried and convicted in Indiana by a
military tribunal.”).
16 Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543–44 (1981).
17 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
18 Parisi, 405 U.S. at 47 (Douglas, J., concurring).
14
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preclusive effect to orders denying habeas relief, and essentially
limited habeas corpus relief to bad faith or patently unreasonable state
19
court errors.” Following AEDPA, Supreme Court decisions “reflect
a general preference towards substantial deference to lower court
findings, limits on review in the interest of finality, and general
limitations on the application of constitutional rules to state
20
prisoners.”
The literature addressing the narrowed path to habeas relief
examines the impact of habeas-specific statutes, rules, and policy. The
message in that line of scholarship is, essentially, that habeas is
“different.” But missing is an acknowledgement of the many ways in
which habeas cases are so much like other federal civil cases.
A prisoner’s federal habeas petition progresses procedurally much
like all federal civil cases. Even though habeas corpus petitions
challenge criminal convictions, they are processed as civil cases and
assigned a civil docket number.21 The analog to a complaint in the
habeas context is an “application,” which, like a complaint,
commences the action.22
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply by default “to the
23
extent that they are not inconsistent with the Habeas Corpus Rules.”
For example, Rule 12(b)(6) applies to States’ motions to dismiss
24
petitions brought pursuant to section 2254. And motions to amend a
State’s answer to a habeas petition are governed by Rule 15(a).25 In
theory, if “a statutory time limitation is forfeited if not raised in a

19 Stephen F. Smith, Articles, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L.
REV. 283, 301 (2008).
20 Jordon T. Stanley, “Deference Does Not Imply Abandonment or Abdication of
Judicial Review”: The Evolution of Habeas Jurisprudence Under AEDPA and the
Rehnquist Court, 72 UNIV. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 739, 745 (2004).
21 Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness
in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 317 n.53 (2002).
22 McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 866 n.2 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
23 Id. (citing Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 11; FED. R.
CIV. P. 81(a)(2) (current version at FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(4)); see also Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000).
24 Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009).
25 See, e.g., Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying Rule 15(a) to
a motion for leave to amend answer to habeas petition, and stating that “[c]ourts may
freely grant leave when justice so requires, and public policy strongly encourages courts to
permit amendments” (citations omitted)).
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defendant’s answer or in an amendment thereto” pursuant to Rules
26
8(c), 12(b), and 15(a), the same should be true in habeas.
For a limited period of time at the beginning of a habeas case,
habeas procedure varies from the procedure in other civil cases. Rule
4 of the habeas rules (applicable in section 2254 cases) provides that a
court assigned a habeas petition “must promptly examine it,” and “[i]f
it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must
dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.”27
However, if the judge does not dismiss the petition, the court will
28
order the respondent to answer or move to dismiss. As a result,
unlike any other civil case, in habeas, a district court may act to
dismiss a frivolous pleading before the defendant has to answer or
move to dismiss.29
Yet with the exception of the pre-answer review described above, a
habeas petition should progress procedurally just as any other federal
civil action does. With respect to procedure, habeas is like other civil
cases, not different.
II
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES: WHAT THEY ARE, AND HOW THEY ARE
PLED
To understand why affirmative defenses to habeas corpus petitions
should be treated like any other affirmative defense, it is useful to
understand exactly what an affirmative defense is, and why
affirmative defenses are governed by specific pleading standards.
A. Affirmative Defenses Under the Federal Rules
In the context of habeas corpus petitions, the defenses of statute of
limitations, exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, and
nonretroactivity are all affirmative defenses.30 But what makes a
defense an affirmative defense?

26

Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006).
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 4.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999). Kiser also holds that
Rule 8(c) “does not bar sua sponte consideration of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations
provision” because Rule 8(c) is inconsistent with Rule 4 of the habeas rules. Id. at 329.
30 Day, 547 U.S. at 208.
27
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Civil defendants can avoid liability in a number of ways. If a
doctor is sued for medical malpractice with respect to a patient he
never treated, the doctor might reply to the patient’s complaint with
emphatic factual denials. In so doing, the doctor will attack the
31
patient’s prima facie case by way of a “negative defense.” In
response to plaintiff’s allegations, the doctor essentially says “no.”
But a doctor sued by a patient he did treat may accept all of the
patient’s allegations as true and still win if he asserts an affirmative
defense. An affirmative defense based on, for example, assumption of
risk, does not require the doctor to deny any of the plaintiff patient’s
32
factual allegations, but may still result in a victory for the doctor.
“An affirmative defense is one that admits the allegations in the
complaint, but avoids liability, in whole or in part, by new allegations
of excuse, justification or other negating matters.”33 It “raises matters
extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima facie case.”34 An affirmative
defense sets forth “new allegations,” and therefore, a defendant acts
35
affirmatively in pleading it. In asserting an affirmative defense, the
doctor’s response to a patient’s allegations is not “no,” but rather,
“yes, but . . .”
To plead the affirmative defense of assumption of risk, the
defendant doctor would have to assert that the plaintiff “voluntarily
assume[d] a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless
conduct of the defendant.”36 Assumption of risk is an affirmative
defense because it “comes into question only where there would
otherwise be a breach of some duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff,” and “relieves the defendant of the liability to which he
would otherwise be subject.”37
Affirmative defenses are descendants of the common law plea of
“confession and avoidance.” At common law, confession and
avoidance “permitted a defendant who was willing to admit that the
31

Riemer v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 274 F.R.D. 637, 639 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
33 Riemer, 274 F.R.D. at 639.
34 In re Rawson Food Service, Inc., 846 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Ford
Motor Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 795 F.2d 538, 546 (6th Cir. 1986)).
35 Technically, “[a]n affirmative defense is . . . ‘[a] defendant’s assertion [which]
rais[es] new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s
claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true.’” Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316
F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 430 (7th ed.1999)); see
also Gwin v. Curry, 161 F.R.D. 70, 71 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
37 Id. § 496G cmt. c.
32
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plaintiff’s declaration demonstrated a prima facie case to then go on
and allege additional new material that would defeat the plaintiff’s
38
otherwise valid cause of action.”
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)’s Affirmative Defense
Pleading Standard
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its subsections
govern pleading standards. Rule 8(a) controls how claims must be
39
pled, while Rule 8(c) controls how a party is to plead affirmative
defenses, providing that “[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense,” including:
“accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel,
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute
of limitations, and waiver.”40
Although Rule 8(c) is a subsection of a rule very clearly pertaining
to pleading standards, it is often described as a substantive rule about
affirmative defenses. An oft-repeated quote from the venerable
Wright & Miller treatise describes Rule 8(c) as a “lineal descendent
of the common-law plea in ‘confession and avoidance,’ which
permitted a defendant who was willing to admit that plaintiff’s
declaration demonstrated a prima facie case to then go on and allege
additional new material that would defeat plaintiff’s otherwise valid
cause of action.”41 This is not entirely accurate, and treating Rule 8(c)
as anything but a pleading standard robs it of its bite.
First, the Federal Rules treat affirmative defenses differently than
the common law treated confession and avoidance. Under the
common law, a defendant “could not both deny the elements of the
plaintiff’s substantive claim and use a confession and avoidance.”42
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminate the “imposed election
between the pleader’s right to deny the allegations in the complaint

38

WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 1270.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
41 Middle East Eng’g & Dev. Co. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 86 Civ.
834 (MGC), 1987 WL 17419, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1270 (2d ed. 1969 &
West Supp. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 5 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, at § 1270.
39
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and the right to interpose other defensive matter,” by virtue of Rule
43
8(e), “which allows alternative and hypothetical pleading.”
Second, Rule 8(c) does not codify the common law confession and
avoidance defenses. In common law pleading, matters in confession
and avoidance were matters which said “yes”—that is, they admitted
the complaint’s allegations—and also said “but”—that is, they
“suggest[ed] some other reasons why there was no right.”44 Rule 8(c),
unlike the common law, “makes no attempt to define the concept of
affirmative defense.”45 The rule lists nineteen defenses, some of
which would not have been considered matters in confession and
avoidance, re-labels them affirmative defenses, and further states that
those affirmative defenses, along with any other affirmative defenses
not expressly listed, must be asserted in a defendant’s responsive
pleading.46 The drafters did not intend for Rule 8(c) to be a
substantive rule; rather, it was meant to require that “certain regularly
occurring matters” be set forth in the affirmative before the district
court considers them to be part of the case.47
In sum, Rule 8(c) is a pleading standard, not a substantive rule, and
certainly not a lineal descendant of common law defenses.
C. Rule 8(c) Is A Waiver Rule With No Exceptions
Rule 8(c) is clear with respect to a defendant’s pleading burdens:
“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any
avoidance or affirmative defense.”48 The Supreme Court has
described Rule 8(c) in absolute terms: the rule “identifies a
nonexhaustive list of affirmative defenses that must be pleaded” in
response to a complaint.49 Moreover, Rule 8(c), and all “the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are ‘as binding as any statute duly enacted
by Congress, and federal courts have no more discretion to disregard

43

Id.
Id. (quoting AM. BAR. ASS’N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY
49 (Edward H. Hammond ed., 1939) (statement of Hon. Charles Clark) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS].
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (emphasis added).
49 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007) (emphasis added).
44
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the Rule[s] . . . than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory
50
provisions.’”
Several policy reasons support strict application of Rule 8(c). First,
there is nothing unfair about strict compliance with Rule 8(c): “Rule
8(c) . . . place[s] the opposing parties on notice that a particular
defense will be pursued so as to prevent surprise or unfair
prejudice.”51 The rule’s mandatory provision regarding affirmative
defenses was intended to be “definite and certain,” as well as fair to
the plaintiff, who is provided with notice at a case’s inception as to
what affirmative material will be raised against it.52 Under the rule,
“[a] general assertion that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a
claim is insufficient to protect the plaintiff from being ambushed with
an affirmative defense.”53 Rather, defenses must be affirmatively
stated.
Furthermore, “our legal system is replete with rules requiring that
certain matters be raised at particular times.”54 Rule 8(c) is one of
those rules. In this respect, however, Rule 8(c) stands apart from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole, which were intended to
render procedure subservient to the merits.55 Rule 8(c) is a rule that, if
not followed, permits procedure to trump substance. As explained
below, this divergence was intentional.
In 1939, one year after the rules went into effect, Honorable
Charles E. Clark, the Reporter to the Supreme Court’s Advisory
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure and the rules’ principal
draftsman, described Rule 8(c) as follows:
50 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 66 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255
(1988)).
51 Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003).
52 5 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 1270 (quoting PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 44, at 49).
53 Saks, 316 F.3d at 350.
54 Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
55 Honorable Charles E. Clark was one of the greatest influences on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. “After nearly 15 years at the Yale Law School spent teaching and
writing on civil procedure, Clark was appointed Reporter to the Supreme Court’s Advisory
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure.” Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 915 (1976). Clark was “the
nation’s foremost authority on code procedure, and he seized the opportunity to embed
throughout the federal rules his philosophy that procedural rules should be subservient to
trials on the merits.” Douglas D. McFarland, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The
Transaction or Occurrence and the Claim Interlock Civil Procedure, 12 FLA. COASTAL L.
REV. 247, 251 n.25 (2011) (citing Charles E Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH U.
L. Q. 297, 297 (1938)).
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[Rule 8(c)] is an attempt to handle specifically a question which
has raised a great deal of difficulty in pleading generally, and
particularly in the codes of the country. It seems to be considered
only fair that certain types of things which in common law pleading
were matters in confession and avoidance—i.e., matters which
seemed more or less to admit the general complaint and yet to
suggest some other reasons why there was no right—must be
specifically pleaded in the answer, and that has been a general
56
rule.

Clark described the waiver rule as “fair”—the waiver rule is
necessary in order to counterbalance the effect of permitting
defendants to raise defenses “which seemed more or less to admit the
general complaint and yet to suggest some other reasons why there
was no right.”57 It is a privilege, Clark seemed to be saying, to allow
defendants to raise affirmative defenses. Therefore, if defendants are
to be afforded that privilege, the consequences of permitting
affirmative defenses in general will be counterbalanced by requiring
that they be pled in a particular way. For that reason, there is only one
protection against the waiver rule’s severity: the freedom to amend
safeguards any defense that might otherwise be waived by virtue of
58
Rule 8(c).
Despite its express language and singular purpose, in practice, Rule
8(c) begins to look more like a suggestion. By 1975, the Second
Circuit described Rule 8(c)’s waiver provision as “[t]he ordinary
consequence of failing to plead an affirmative defense.”59 Only
ordinarily would a defense’s forced waiver exclude the defense from
the case. “In the real world, however, failure to plead an affirmative
defense will rarely result in waiver.”60 Even Wright and Miller
describe the rule with a touch of irony:
It is a frequently stated proposition . . . that a failure to plead an
affirmative defense as required by Federal Rule 8(c) results in the
waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the case. . . . [A]s a
practical matter there are numerous
exceptions to it based on the
61
circumstances of particular cases.

56 5 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 1270 (quoting PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 44, at 49) (emphasis added).
57 Id.
58 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 44, at 74.
59 Jakobsen v. Mass. Port Auth., 520 F.2d 810, 813 (1st Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
60 Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 734, 736 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“[F]ailure to
advance a defense initially should prevent its later assertion only if that will seriously
prejudice the opposing party.”).
61 5 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 1278.
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Nevertheless, because Rule 8(c), like any other Federal Rule, is
binding, and because it was intended to stand apart as a procedural
rule with bite, no federal court has authority to sua sponte cast it
aside.
III
SUA SPONTE ACTION: WHEN COURTS RAISE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
NORMALLY RAISED BY THE PARTIES
The federal system is an adversarial system of justice. If the system
functions normally, “courts are generally limited to addressing the
claims and arguments advanced by the parties.”62 “[T]he parties are
obliged to present facts and legal arguments before a neutral and
relatively passive decision-maker.”63 But the system does not always
function according to plan. When courts take action sua sponte by
raising claims or defenses without prompting from any of the parties,
they act according to their inherent authority.64 Courts are required to
take certain action sua sponte. A familiar form of sua sponte action is
a court’s sua sponte invocation of the defense of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.65
Once a defense is branded as one that affects a court’s subject
matter jurisdiction, a court must raise the defense sua sponte.66
Because jurisdictional defenses are never waived, they may be raised
at any moment throughout litigation, sua sponte or otherwise—even
after a district court has held a trial and reached a decision on the
merits.
As a result, whether a defense goes to a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction is not merely a semantic question, but one of
67
“considerable practical importance” for both judges and litigants.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that mislabeling a defense as one
that implicates subject matter jurisdiction may waste judicial
resources and unfairly prejudice litigants who have litigated the
matter without knowledge of the defense’s applicability.68 The
62

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2006).
64 See, e.g., Hooper v. City of Montgomery, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1338 (M.D. Ala.
2007).
65 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (citing United States v. Cotton, 535
U.S. 625, 630 (2002)).
66 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202.
67 Id.
68 Id.
63
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consequences that attach to the jurisdictional label may be so drastic
69
that the Court has tried to limit the use of the term “jurisdictional.”
Absent sua sponte intervention, the “normal operation” with
respect to affirmative defenses is Rule 8(c)’s waiver rule, which
requires a defendant, and not the court, to plead a statute of
limitations defense, along with any other affirmative defense, in its
answer to the complaint.70 The Fourth Circuit has held that in
“ordinary” civil cases, district courts may not raise and consider a
defense of statute of limitations sua sponte.71 The court explained that
the statute of limitations is a defense “waivable by the inaction of a
party;” it “bears the hallmarks of our adversarial system of justice,”
one that is notable in that the parties present the facts and legal
arguments before a neutral and, ideally, passive court.72
In addition, the Supreme Court has warned federal courts raising
otherwise waivable affirmative defenses sua sponte to be cautious.73
Why? Because raising an affirmative defense sua sponte “erod[es] the
principle of party presentation so basic to our system of
adjudication.”74 That is, in a neutral system, a defendant should be the
party pointing out the weaknesses of a plaintiff’s claim. If the Court
raises this argument on the defendant’s behalf, the system is no longer
neutral, and the Court has become the defendant’s representative.
These are the same concerns courts have when they convert a defense
into one that implicates subject matter jurisdiction: the practice “alters
the normal operation of our adversarial system,” under which “courts
are generally limited to addressing the claims and arguments
advanced by the parties.”75
Altering the normal course of our adversarial system makes sense
in the context of subject matter jurisdiction. Though a subject matter
69 Id. at 1203 (stating that “‘claim-processing rules.’ . . . [T]hat seek to promote the
orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at
certain specified times” should not be deemed jurisdictional). For a discussion of the many
risks inherent in converting administrative exhaustion, a non-jurisdictional affirmative
defense in Title VII cases, into a defense that implicates subject matter jurisdiction, see
Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Improper Dismissal of Title VII Claims on “Jurisdictional”
Exhaustion Grounds: How Federal Courts Require That Allegations Be Presented to an
Agency Without the Resources to Consider Them, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 213
(2011).
70 Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 968 (7th Cir. 1997).
71 Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648 656–57 (4th Cir. 2006).
72 Id. at 654.
73 Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412–13 (2000).
74 Id.
75 Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
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jurisdiction defense may benefit one party over another, it more
importantly protects the courts’ own interests: “federal courts have an
independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of
their jurisdiction.”76 Therefore, “they must raise and decide
jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook[ed] or
77
elect[ed] not to press.”
But if a court is dealing with a non-jurisdictional affirmative
defense, it has no Article III-based obligation to raise the defense and
little reason to upset the normal course of operation. Nevertheless,
federal courts have been exceedingly willing to raise affirmative
defenses sua sponte in habeas actions. This is the case even though
the defenses have the effect of defeating claims that, absent the
application of the defenses, might have succeeded in overturning
wrongful imprisonments.78
IV
THE SPECIAL CONCERN OF HABEAS CASES: RAISING AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES TO DEFEAT A PETITIONER’S APPLICATION TO BE FREED
Habeas cases are frequently exempted from the category of
“ordinary” cases in which Rule 8(c) applies. According to the Fourth
Circuit, defenses raised in habeas cases implicate “important judicial
and public interests,” and the courts adjudicating habeas petitions
have a “quasi-inquisitorial role . . . to screen initial filings.”79
Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, the very nature of a habeas
action justifies departure from the general rule that a defendant “must
either timely raise a statute of limitations defense or waive its
benefits.”80
The Fourth Circuit’s position is not extreme. At all levels of federal
court adjudication, from reports and recommendations issued by
magistrates on motions to dismiss, to Supreme Court decisions
regarding the scope of a petition for certiorari, federal courts bend
over backwards to raise affirmative defenses on behalf of habeas
respondents. In the context of habeas, the courts have abandoned any
76

Id.
Id.
78 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209–10 (2005). “Normally, the only proper
defendant in a habeas case is the petitioner’s ‘immediate custodian’—that is, the warden of
the facility in which the petitioner is incarcerated at the time he files the habeas petition.”
Fletcher v. Reilly, 433 F.3d 867, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
79 Eriline v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 657 (2006).
80 Id.
77
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concern for the adversarial process and Rule 8(c) by raising the most
significant affirmative defenses sua sponte. When courts take such
unwarranted action, they are more advocate than neutral
decisionmaker.
The defenses subject to sua sponte action in habeas cases are
numerous. As explained below, district courts may consider a statute
of limitations defense to habeas sua sponte so long as the government
81
did not purposefully omit it from its answer or motion to dismiss.
82
Exhaustion may also be raised sua sponte. A court may apply the
nonretroactivity rule announced in Teague v. Lane83 sua sponte.84
Although procedural default is not a jurisdictional defense, and Rule
8(c) mandates that it should be waived if it does not appear in the
respondent’s answer, courts nevertheless do not hesitate to raise the
defense sua sponte.85
Day v. McDonough is the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling on
which defenses may be raised sua sponte in habeas. While expanding
the category of defenses that may be raised sua sponte, the Court
paradoxically noted that district judges “have no obligation to assist
attorneys representing the State.”86 Yet no heed is paid to this
warning. There is a competing principle throughout federal habeas
precedent: habeas relief, for some reason, is “different,” and those
opposing habeas petitions deserve a helping hand from the courts. As
explained below, by raising affirmative defenses sua sponte, courts
provide significant, case-dispositive assistance to attorneys
representing the State—at the expense of those unjustly behind bars.
A. Granberry v. Greer: Appellate Courts May Raise Exhaustion Sua
Sponte
In Granberry, a state prisoner applied to the Southern District of
Illinois for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.87
The district court dismissed the petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.88 On appeal, the State of Illinois
for the first time raised an exhaustion defense—that is, it argued in
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Day, 547 U.S. at 209–10.
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133 (1987).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
Day, 547 U.S. at 206.
Elzy v. United States, 205 F.3d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 2000).
Day, 547 U.S. at 210.
481 U.S. at 130.
Id.
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support of the lower court’s dismissal on the new grounds that the
89
petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies. Pursuant to Rule
8(c), the State should have raised the defense in its responsive
pleading; instead, the State moved for dismissal for failure to state a
claim. But the court of appeals rejected petitioner’s argument that the
90
State waived the defense by not raising it at the district court level.
In considering this defense, the court of appeals also overlooked the
general rule that a federal appellate court “does not consider an issue
91
not passed upon below.”
In reviewing whether the appellate court could address the issue
even though the State had failed to raise it at the district court level,
the Court acknowledged that, unlike a subject matter jurisdiction
defense, “failure to exhaust state remedies does not deprive an
appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of a habeas
corpus application.”92 Therefore, the court was not required to raise
the defense of exhaustion sua sponte in order to preserve its own
interests. The Court also reviewed precedent in which it had
“expressed [its] reluctance to adopt rules that allow a party to
withhold raising a defense until after the ‘main event’—in this case,
the proceeding in the District Court—is over.”93
The Court chose a middle ground, declining to require that
appellate courts raise nonexhaustion sua sponte, and also declining to
hold that the State’s omission of the defense waived it for good.
Instead, the Court held that appellate courts may, but are not required
to, consider the defense of failure to exhaust even if the State failed to
raise the defense before the district court.94
In so holding, the Court relied upon the history and purpose of the
exhaustion of state remedies defense. First, it noted that the defense
was long-standing, applied even before Congress codified it in 1948;
as early as 1886, the Court wrote that “‘federal courts should not
consider a claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state courts
have had an opportunity to act.’”95 Second, the exhaustion doctrine is
justified by comity to state courts: “‘federal courts . . . will interfere
with the administration of justice in the state courts only in rare cases
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id.
Id. at 130.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).
Granberry, 418 U.S. at 131.
Id. at 132 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89–90 (1977).
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 206 (2006).
Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982)).
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where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to
96
exist.’”
Third, even though the State “has a duty to advise the district court
whether the prisoner has . . . exhausted all available state remedies” in
its answer, when the state fails to do so, it may be appropriate “for the
97
court of appeals to take a fresh look at the issue.” Comity is also a
concern for appellate courts: at the appellate level, courts are to
“determine whether the interests of comity and federalism will be
better served by addressing the merits forthwith or by requiring a
series of additional state and district court proceedings before
98
reviewing the merits of the petitioner’s claim.”
According to Granberry, raising the exhaustion defense sua sponte
is appropriate in at least two instances. First, raising the defense on
the State’s behalf is appropriate where exhaustion may address an
99
unresolved question of law or fact. Therefore, once exhaustion is
completed, the Court need only review the issues that truly require
federal review, an approach that serves both “both comity and judicial
efficiency.”100 Second, if the habeas petition clearly does not raise a
colorable federal claim, then the parties’ interests, as well the Court’s
interests, are well-served by affirming the district court’s dismissal on
101
exhaustion grounds.
The prior justifications hinge on an outcome in which the petition
is without merit. The Court found that, by contrast, where the district
court has held a trial on the merits and finds that there was a
miscarriage of justice, then the appellate courts should, in those
instances, find that the exhaustion defense has been waived.102
Otherwise, the Court would “delay in granting relief that is plainly
warranted.”103
Granberry is severe: “the asserting of an exhaustion issue for the
first time on appeal can result in the loss of an entire lawsuit.”104
Also, “[a] rule requiring dismissal when the defense of nonexhaustion

96 Id. at 134 (quoting Rose, 455 U.S. at 515–16) (second internal quotation marks
omitted).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 134–35.
100 Id. at 135.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Ybarra v. Sumner, 678 F. Supp. 1480, 1483 (D. Nev. 1988).
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is raised at the appellate level for the first time . . . would never
105
operate to the prisoner’s benefit.”
If the prisoner wins in district
106
court, then the State could raise the defense on appeal.
If the
prisoner loses in the district court and appeals, “the rule requiring
dismissal would not result in reversal of the denial of habeas
107
relief.”
B. Caspari v. Bohlen: Federal Courts May Raise Nonretroactivity Sua
Sponte
In Caspari, the Court addressed whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibited a court from subjecting a defendant to multiple
noncapital sentence enhancement proceedings.108 The state trial court
sentenced Bohlen as a prior offender, but the Missouri Court of
Appeals reversed because there were no factual findings to establish
109
that he held that status. On remand, Bohlen argued that permitting
the State another opportunity to prove that he qualified for the
sentence enhancement violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.110 The
Court concluded that, at the time of Bohlen’s conviction and sentence,
the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to noncapital sentencing.111
As a result, Bohlen’s habeas claim violated the nonretroactivity
rule announced in Teague v. Lane.112 “The nonretroactivity principle
prevents a federal court from granting habeas corpus relief to a state
prisoner based on a rule announced after his conviction and sentence
became final.”113 Nonretroactivity does not implicate a court’s
jurisdiction; therefore, federal courts are not required to raise the
defense sua sponte.114 However, the Supreme Court explained that “a
federal court may, but need not, decline to apply Teague if the State

105

Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133 n.6.
Id.
107 Id.
108 Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 386 (1994).
109 Id. at 387.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 393.
112 Id. at 393 (“[A] reasonable jurist reviewing our precedents at the time respondent’s
conviction and sentence became final would not have considered the application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause to a noncapital sentencing proceeding to be dictated by our
precedents.”).
113 Id. at 389.
114 Id. (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990)).
106

MACFARLANE

2012]

10/22/2012 1:02 PM

Adversarial No More

197

does not argue it.”115 In so holding, the Court did not identify the
116
policy justifying this particular departure from Rule 8(c).
Nevertheless, the rule remains that the nonretroactivity defense
may be raised sua sponte. In applying this rule, lower courts have
paid lip service to “finality and comity,” though the Supreme Court
has never stated that Teague should be raised sua sponte for those
reasons.117
C. Appellate Courts Have Unanimously Held Procedural Default
May Be Raised Sua Sponte
Procedural default is an additional exhaustion rule. It “ensure[s]
that state prisoners not only become ineligible for state relief before
raising their claims in federal court, but also that they give state courts
118
a sufficient opportunity to decide those claims before doing so.” As
the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] habeas petitioner who has
concededly exhausted his state remedies must also have properly
done so by giving the State a fair ‘opportunity to pass upon [his
claims].’”119 When a prisoner has not adhered to the State’s
procedural rules, he has procedurally defaulted his habeas claims and
can only proceed in federal court if he can demonstrate “‘cause and
prejudice’” or “‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”120
As a result, if state law requires that a criminal defendant challenge
the composition of a grand jury in advance of trial, he must have
actually challenged the grand jury in advance of trial if he wishes to
raise the same challenge in a federal habeas petition. The Supreme
Court justifies the procedural default rule as yet another manner in
which the federal system bows in comity to state courts and their
121
remedies.
Comity dictates, the Court has held, that a habeas
petitioner “use the State’s established appellate review procedures
before he presents his claims to a federal court.”122
Whether the defense may be raised sua sponte is an open question
in the Supreme Court. Yet “the Courts of Appeals have unanimously
115

Id. (citing Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1994)).
See id.
117 See, e.g., Prevatte v. French, 459 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1328, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
118 O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 853 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 854 (alteration in original) (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204
(1950)).
120 Id. at 854 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 484, 495 (1986)).
121 Id. at 853–54.
122 Id. at 845.
116
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held that, in appropriate circumstances, courts, on their own initiative,
123
may raise a petitioner’s procedural default.”
In the courts of
appeals, the justifications for raising this defense sua sponte range
from “comity,”124 concerns for the finality of criminal judgments,
subjective decisions with respect to whether the defendant was
“blameworthy” for failing to raise the issue, to conclusions that
procedural default may be “manifest from the record and, hence,” do
125
not require further fact-finding.
D. Day v. McDonough: Statute of Limitations Defenses May Be
Raised Sua Sponte
Until AEDPA, there was no statute of limitations governing habeas
126
petitions. But since 1996, habeas petitions must be filed one year
from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review.”127 In Day, the State of Florida’s answer to Patrick Day’s
habeas petition stated that the petition was timely, even though
pursuant to AEDPA, it was not.128
The Court explained that “[o]rdinarily in civil litigation, a statutory
time limitation is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in
an amendment thereto.”129 Moreover, ordinarily, the Court “would
count it an abuse of discretion to override a State’s deliberate waiver
of a limitations defense.”130 Yet in Day, the Court did override the
State’s waiver on the grounds that the State’s waiver was not
intelligent but rather the result of miscalculation of whether the
“tight” statute of limitations had run.131 Therefore, the district court
had discretion to correct the miscalculation, and could dismiss the
petition as untimely under AEDPA’s one-year limitation period.132
The Court’s holding relied first on the procedural posture of the
petition. First, the Court noted that if the magistrate judge had not
raised the defense sua sponte, the judge might have instead “informed
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 207 (2006).
Brewer v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 993, 999 (1st Cir. 1997).
Rosario v. United States, 164 F.3d 729, 732–33 (2d Cir. 1998).
Day, 547 U.S. at 202 n.1.
Id. at 201 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006)).
Id. at 203.
Id. at 202 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c), 12(b), 15(a)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the State of its obvious computation error and entertained an
133
amendment to the State’s answer.” Second, the Court stated that “it
would make scant sense to distinguish in this regard AEDPA’s time
bar from other threshold constraints on federal habeas petitioners.”134
Third, the court was satisfied that the magistrate judge gave Day
“due notice and a fair opportunity” to oppose dismissal on the
grounds that his petition was untimely.135 The court was also
136
persuaded that the State had merely committed inadvertent error.
The notice had issued some nine months after the State answered the
petition, no court proceedings had occurred in the interim, and
nothing else in the record suggested that the State “strategically”
137
Finally, the Court
withheld the defense or chose to relinquish it.
noted that “[a] district court’s discretion is confined within these
limits,” and “should a State intelligently choose to waive a statute of
limitations defense, a district court would not be at liberty to disregard
that choice.”138
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Wood v. Milyard
to address a slight variation on the question presented in Day: whether
appellate courts, like district courts, have the authority to raise sua
sponte a 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) statute of limitations defense.139 The
petitioner argued that only district courts, and not appellate courts,
should able to raise the defense because, essentially, district courts are
better-situated to do so:
A clear requirement that the state raise any § 2244(d) limitations
defense in the district court has the virtue of simplicity and ease of
enforcement. It advances judicial economy by requiring that
dispositive limitations defenses be raised and resolved before
judicial resources are needlessly expended in deciding the merits of
a case or other difficult issues of exhaustion or procedural default.
Such requirement discourages sandbagging, preventing a party from
initially withholding a limitations defense for strategic advantage, in
the hope of prevailing on other claims or defenses. It advances the
adversary and party presentation principles underlying the
American judicial system, by requiring issues to be presented by the
parties to the court. And, finally, it advances the judicial neutrality

133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 209 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006)).
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 210–11.
Id.
Id. at 211 n.11.
Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1829 (2012).
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and appearance
of impartiality that is essential to our system of
140
justice.

Respondents have noted that Granberry involved an appellate court’s
sua sponte raising of an affirmative defense.141 They have also relied
on the argument that habeas is unique: “given . . . the special concerns
underlying federal review of state-court convictions, the courts of
appeals should have especially wide latitude to consider a forfeited
142
issue that can terminate the appeal expeditiously.”
143
The Court decided Milyard on April 24, 2012.
The Court
agreed with Respondents, holding that “courts of appeals, like district
courts, have the authority—though not the obligation—to raise a
144
forfeited timeliness defense on their own initiative.” Nevertheless,
the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision to raise the limitations
defense sua sponte on the grounds that the State’s waiver of the
defense was a knowing waiver.145 As a result, the circumstance
presented to the Tenth Circuit was not the sort of extraordinary
instance in which the appellate court was permitted to raise on its own
an issue otherwise not raised below.146
Despite reversing the Tenth Circuit, Milyard did not undo the
damage done in Day. Rather, it opened the door to broader sua sponte
authority at the appellate level.
V
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN HABEAS PETITIONS SHOULD BE WAIVED
IF NOT RAISED ACCORDING TO RULE 8(C)
A. Rule 8(c) Applies to Habeas Cases
The Court’s reasoning for exempting affirmative defenses in
habeas petitions from the harshness of Rule 8(c) is unconvincing. The
reasoning in Day v. McDonough is conclusory: it would make “scant
sense” to distinguish AEDPA’s time bar from other affirmative

140

Brief for Petitioner at 27, Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012) (No. 10-9995).
Brief for Respondents at 14, Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012) (No. 109995).
142 Id. at 15.
143 Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826.
144 Id. at 1834.
145 Id.
146 Id.
141
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defenses available to habeas respondents.147 Not only is this reason
conclusory, but it assumes that the Court’s precedent regarding
exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, nonretroactivity, and
(prior to AEDPA) abuse of the writ is reliable. But Day is also wrong
for a simpler reason: Rule 8(c) should apply to habeas corpus
defenses.
Day does not identify any “inconsistency between habeas corpus
148
practice and the usual civil forfeiture rule,”
and “applying the
ordinary rule of forfeiture to the AEDPA statute of limitations creates
no inconsistency with the Habeas Rules.”149 Rule 8(c) should have
applied in Day, and should have stopped the Court from endorsing the
district court’s raising of an already waived defense sua sponte.
With respect to Rule 8(c), there is no reason to treat a State
respondent any differently than another defendant. As explained
below, Judge Clark argued for strict compliance with Rule 8(c), with
no exceptions granted to defendants who happened to also be the
government. He even addressed a statute of limitations defense,
explaining that in cases in which the United States is the defendant,
he still could not see how the defense “could properly be a
jurisdictional matter” raised sua sponte by the courts; rather, Rule
150
8(c) should govern how the defense is to be raised.
Judge Clark explained that when the Federal Rules endeavored to
treat a particular litigant differently, they did so expressly. For
example, when the United States is the defendant, the Federal Rules
give them more time than other litigants have to answer.151 However,
with the exception of the time to answer, or other express provisions,
“these rules apply to the United States as a litigant as much as to
anyone else.”152 There is no reason to treat the United States
government or any State government preferentially when it comes to
affirmative defenses, in habeas cases or any other kind of litigation.
Even though habeas relief may be “unique,” the applicable pleading
standards are routine.

147 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
majority opinion at 209).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 218.
150 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 44, at 50–51.
151 See id. at 50.
152 Id. at 50.
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B. No Policy Reason Justifies Sua Sponte Revival of Affirmative
Defenses
The Supreme Court has justified its sua sponte precedent on the
grounds of comity to state court judgments, by minimizing its
procedural impact, and by citing questionable precedent. None of
these justifications support overruling Rule 8(c).
1. Comity Justifies the Existence of Certain Affirmative Defenses, But
Does Not Excuse Raising Them Sua Sponte
Granberry permits appellate courts to raise exhaustion sua sponte
on several stated grounds: (1) courts have been able to do so for some
time; (2) interfering with state court judgments should be a rare
practice; and (3) comity and federalism require deference to state
court decisions.153 Similarly, the appellate court practice of raising
procedural default sua sponte also pays lip service to finality and
154
comity. Both of these precedents rely on the deference supposedly
due state court sentences and procedures. Yet this deference is
misplaced.
First, in concluding that comity justifies permitting federal courts
to raise affirmative defenses sua sponte, courts conflate the need for
the defense itself with the need for the defense to be raised sua
sponte. For example, Granberry emphasizes that “comity was the
basis for the exhaustion doctrine,” and that exhaustion renders
interference with state court judgments only in rare instances.155 But
the question presented in Granberry was not whether exhaustion is a
viable defense. The question was whether a court should raise the
defense when the defendant waives it.156 Re-emphasizing the nature
of the defense itself sidesteps the issue of whether there is an
additional need to preserve it on a defendant’s behalf. Granberry’s
reliance on comity is circular reasoning.
Second, invoking comity in habeas cases overlooks the very
157
purpose of habeas: review of state court criminal judgments. The
availability of federal relief to persons in state custody “is a procedure

153

See supra notes 101–04.
See supra notes 123–24, 126–27.
155 Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987).
156 Id. at 130.
157 Sylvander v. New Eng. Home For Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1111 (1st Cir.
1978).
154
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of unique potency within the federal-state framework.”158 It is unique
because the procedure prioritizes fixing constitutional errors over a
state’s interest in finality. “Federal habeas involves a substantial
thrust by the federal system into the sphere normally reserved to the
159
states and hence a change in the federal-state balance.”
The exhaustion requirement balances habeas’s concern for
constitutional issues, but habeas in the first instance is a mechanism
that does not respect comity. As a result, it makes little sense to use
comity as the justification that permits a court to act on behalf of a
State respondent each time it chooses to do so. Also, this reflexive
reliance on comity overlooks the fact that “federal habeas . . . offers a
federal forum regardless of what state proceedings have already taken
place.”160 Comity alone does not justify overruling Rule 8(c).
2. The Federal Rules Provide Adequate Safeguards for Defendants
Who Waive Affirmative Defenses: There Is No Need for Additional
Rules in Habeas
In Day, the Court was willing to permit a magistrate judge to raise
the statute of limitations defense sua sponte because the magistrate
might have alternatively informed the State of its calculation error and
161
granted leave to amend. The Court stated that it saw no difference
between permitting a defense to be raised sua sponte and the
Magistrate’s ability to grant the State leave to amend after the error
was noted.162
This approach disregards Rule 8(c). “If there truly were no
dispositive difference between following and disregarding the rules
that Congress has enacted, the natural conclusion would be that there
is no compelling reason to disregard” Rule 8(c).163 Moreover, there
already exists a well-developed body of law to govern the district
164
courts’ exercise of discretion under Rule 15(a).
That is, if the
Federal Rules already provide adequate procedural safeguards, there
is no compelling justification for giving State respondents any
additional breaks.

158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Id. at 1111–12.
Id. at 1112.
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)).
Id.
Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 216–17.
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3. Caspari Was Wrongly Decided: Casting Aside Rule 8(c)’s Waiver
Rule With Respect to Retroactivity Has No Precedential Support
Caspari was wrongly decided because it treated dicta in a prior
case as applicable precedent. Relying on the holding in Schiro v.
Farley, the Supreme Court explained that “a federal court may, but
need not, decline to apply Teague[‘s nonretroactivity rule] if the State
165
does not argue it.” However, the Caspari court’s citation to Schiro
misrepresents its thrust. In Schiro, the Court never reached the State’s
Teague argument because it had “failed to argue Teague in its brief in
opposition” and “a State can waive the Teague bar by not raising
it.”166 Schiro does not support the proposition that Teague may be
raised at any stage sua sponte.167 The Schiro “holding” that it could
have reached the Teague issue sua sponte is dicta—it did not reach
168
the issue.
Caspari also reached the State’s nonretroactivity defense, which
was not squarely raised by the certiorari petition, because it concluded
that the issue “is a subsidiary question fairly included in the question
169
presented.”
As Justice Stevens’s dissent highlighted, the
nonretroactivity principle announced in Teague v. Lane is not a
jurisdictional rule, but rather a prudential rule, and, hence, judgemade, and waivable.170 Stevens would have held that the State
forfeited its Teague defense under the Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a).171
CONCLUSION: HABEAS LITIGATION MUST BE ADVERSARIAL WITH
NO FAVORS GRANTED TO ALREADY POWERFUL RESPONDENTS
Federal court litigation is conducted within an adversarial system
of justice. Parties are responsible for developing their own strategy.172
They set the scope of litigation, whereas “courts are generally limited
165

Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994).
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994) (emphasis added).
167 See also Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A
Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part Two), 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 303, 325
(1996) (describing the mixed messages of Schiro and Caspari with respect to waiver of the
nonretroactivity defense).
168 See Schiro, 510 U.S. at 229.
169 Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389.
170 Id. at 397–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171 Id. Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) provides that “[t]he statement of any question
presented [in a petition for certiorari] is deemed to comprise every subsidiary question
fairly included therein. Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein,
will be considered by the Court.”
172 United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 750 (10th Cir. 2008).
166

MACFARLANE

2012]

10/22/2012 1:02 PM

Adversarial No More

205

to addressing the claims and arguments advanced by the parties.”173
Usually, “[c]ourts do not . . . raise claims or arguments on their
174
own.” This divide is a hallmark of American federal litigation.
Unlike the judges of the continental legal systems of Europe, who
serve in both investigative and adjudicatory capacities, American
judges are informed by the parties through an adversarial method. . . .
Thus, American judges play a limited role; the burden rests on the
parties (both private and governmental) to ensure that offenses are
175
prosecuted and relevant issues come to light.
A case’s relevant issues come to light first in the pleadings. The
Supreme Court’s recent pleading standard decisions, Ashcroft v.
176
177
Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, highlight the Court’s
willingness to effect harsh outcomes based on failure to adhere to
another subsection of Rule 8.178 Yet despite the case-ending
implications of failure to adhere to these new pleading standards, a
judge need not remind a plaintiff of the Twombly and Iqbal pleading
standards before it grants a motion to dismiss. The Court has required
plaintiffs to take the reins of their litigation, with respect to both
substance and procedure.179 There should be no hesitation to hold
defendants to similar standards.
Parties must pay attention not only to their substantive strategies,
but also to the procedural consequences of their litigation decisions.
For example, the strategic decision to improperly plead a claim can
defeat that claim at the motion to dismiss stage.180 There is no
question that procedural strategy can be as case dispositive as
substantive strategy.
Failure to adhere to Rule 8(c) can also have dispositive outcomes.
In Day, if the Supreme Court had not saved the otherwise waived

173

Henderson ex rel Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
Id.
175 United States v. Fifield, 485 F.3d 1053, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2007) (O’Scannlain, J,
concurring specially) (citations omitted).
176 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
177 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
178 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557)).
179 Cf. Fifield, 485 F.3d at 1057 (explaining that the functional divide between judge
and party is important enough to “leave some wrongs unpunished” in order to preserve it;
“the doctrines of waiver and procedural default represent this willingness.”).
180 A defendant’s answer or a motion to dismiss must be filed within 20 days of a
plaintiff’s complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).
174
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limitations defense, the petitioner’s habeas application might have
been granted. But Rule 8(c) was intended to be a steadfast rule with
potentially severe consequences for those who did not adhere to its
strictures, and it should not have been overlooked.
Habeas litigation is the last place in which courts should be
disregarding Rule 8(c). Sua sponte action of any kind risks tipping the
scales in favor of one party and against another. But raising
affirmative defenses sua sponte in habeas is particularly unfair in light
of the curtailed substantive paths to habeas relief—habeas petitioners,
not State respondents, are most in need of the courts’ procedural
assistance.
Moreover, the procedural decision to raise certain defenses to
habeas sua sponte cannot rely solely upon the nature of the relief
sought. The Supreme Court’s deference to comity in its affirmative
defense cases is really a discussion of what sort of habeas defenses a
181
But procedural rules should not vary
court should entertain.
depending on the kind of substantive relief at issue. They should
remain steady regardless of a judge’s subjective feelings toward the
importance of a particular claim or defense. Otherwise, Rule 8(c) is a
rule that will always be waived depending on the circumstances. This
is not what the Rule was meant to do.
Finally, to the extent procedural favors are needed in habeas cases,
it is petitioners who need them. Even before AEDPA, Justice Stevens
warned that the Court “has fashioned harsh rules” which “defeat
substantial constitutional claims” brought in habeas petitions.182
Justice Stevens argued that “[i]f we are to apply such a strict approach
to waiver in habeas corpus litigation, we should hold the warden to
the same standard.”183

181
182
183

See discussion supra Part V.B.2.
Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 397 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.

